

## Message Text

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INFO USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 3212

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM NATO, UR, US

SUBJ: USA INSTITUTE ON STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL WEAPONS ISSUES

REF: MOSCOW 2891

1. SUMMARY. ON MARCH 7 USA INSTITUTE STRATEGIC AND DEFENSE SPECIALISTS M.A. MIL'SHTEYN, SVYATOV AND SEMEYKO RECEIVED EMBOFF AND TWO MEMBERS OF U.S. TTBT/PNE DELEGATION (BUCHHEIM AND IFFT) FOR DISCUSSION ON ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES. DURING THE DISCUSSION SEMEYKO PROVIDED FURTHER DETAILS ON HIS SUGGESTION (REF A) THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE WILLING TO UNDERGO AN INITIAL 20-30 PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS CEILINGS IN POST-SALT TWO/NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, HE SAID, SHOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE SALT TWO AGREEMENT. INITIAL REDUCTIONS COULD BE REACHED IN A PURELY BILATERAL FRAMEWORK, THOUGH THE SOVIETS WOULD INSIST ON CHINESE, FRENCH, AND UK PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS BEYOND THAT LEVEL.

2. THE SOVIET PARTICIPANTS RAISED THE ISSUE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND SUGGESTED NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF THESE WEAPONS AS WELL. THEY AVOIDED MAKING A DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN TAC NUKES AND ANY ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS.  
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MIL'SHTEYN SIGNIFIED AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. DEFENSE

POSTURE STATEMENT THAT CHINESE STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES ARE DEVELOPING SLOWLY. SVYATOV URGED NAVAL ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. AND ALL THREE SHOWED LIVELY INTEREST IN U.S. COMPUTATION OF SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING. END SUMMARY.

3. SEMEYKO MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN HIS DISCUSSION OF POST-SALT TWO REDUCTIONS IN CEILINGS. HE SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS SHOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONCLUSION OF SALT TWO. THESE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL, NOT TOKEN. THEY SHOULD BE IN THE RANGE OF 20-30 PERCENT OF AGGREGATE TOTALS. REDUCTIONS OF THIS MAGNITUDE COULD BE REACHED IN PURELY BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. REDUCTIONS BEYOND THIS MAGNITUDE WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE THE FRENCH, THE BRITISH, AND THE CHINESE. HOWEVER, ALL POST-SALT TWO REDUCTION AGREEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE AN ESCAPE CLAUSE BECAUSE OF THE CHINESE, UK AND FRENCH THREATS TO THE SOVIET UNION. WHEN REMINDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, EVEN IF IT DID REDUCE INTERCONTINENTAL SYSTEMS TARGETED ON CHINA, WOULD STILL HAVE SUBSTANTIAL IRBM AND MEDIUM BOMBER CAPABILITY AGAINST CHINA, SEMEYKO ANSWERED THAT "ACCORDING TO AMERICAN SOURCES," THE SOVIET UNION HAS ONLY 70 IRBM'S TARGETED AGAINST CHINA AND JAPAN. IN ANY CASE, HE CONTINUED, THE RANGE LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN THESE SYSTEMS AS GIVEN IN AMERICAN SOURCES PRECLUDE COVERAGE OF THE SOUTHERN HALF OF CHINA. SEMEYKO SAID ADEQUATE COVERAGE COULD NOT BE OBTAINED BY MEDIUM-RANGE BOMBERS BECAUSE OF CHINESE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. THE SOVIET UNION MUST THEREFORE CONTINUE TO TARGET STRATEGIC FORCES AGAINST CHINA AS WELL.

4. CONTINUING ON THE SUBJECT OF REDUCTIONS, SEMEYKO CONTENTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT HAVE ITS FULL ALLOWANCE OF 1320 MIRV'ED SYSTEMS UNTIL WELL INTO THE TEN YEAR DURATION OF THE SALT TWO TREATY. THE SOVIET UNION COULD THEREFORE ACCEPT A SIZEABLE REDUCTION IN MIRV LEVELS WITHOUT HAVING TO DISMANTLE EXISTING SYSTEMS. WHEN REDUCTIONS REACH THE POINT THAT EXISTING SYSTEMS DO HAVE TO BE DISMANTLED, SEMEYKO CONTINUED, AGREEMENT COULD PERHAPS BE REACHED TO DO AWAY WITH OBSOLETE

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SYSTEMS FIRST.

5. SEMEYKO ARGUED THAT AS LONG AS EACH SIDE HAS AT LEAST 500 LAUNCHERS, THE DANGER OF A DISARMING FIRST STRIKE IS VERY LIMITED. HE FURTHER PROPOSED FOR CONSIDERATION A QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS SCHEME BASED ON A DAMAGE FACTOR INFLICTED BY A FIRST STRIKE. HE EXPLAINED THAT BOTH SIDES COULD AGREE TO CONSTRAIN THE QUALITATIVE

LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES SO THAT A FIRST STRIKE WOULD ACHIEVE NO MORE THAN, AS AN EXAMPLE, A 70 PERCENT KILL PROBABILITY. FURTHER STAGES WOULD PROGRESS TO INCREASINGLY SMALLER PERCENTAGES. SEMEYKO ADMITTED SUCH A SCHEME WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT. HE SAID U.S. FEARS OF A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE AGAINST ICBM'S WERE GREATLY EXAGGERATED AND POINTED OUT THAT SOVIETS HAVE MUCH GREATER PERCENTAGE OF THEIR FORCES IN FIXED SILOS THAN DOES U.S.

6. IN DISCUSSION OF NEW SYSTEMS, THE SOVIET PARTICIPANTS IN THE DISCUSSION REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO THE U.S. INSISTENCE ON IMPROVING ACCURACY. THEY ALSO POINTED TO SUCH SYSTEMS AS MX HEAVY ICBM AND MARV AS ADDING UNNECESSARY FUEL TO THE ARMS RACE. SEMEYKO AGAIN RAISED HIS IDEA OF LIMITING THE NUMBER OF TEST FLIGHTS TO RESTRAIN ADVANCES IN ACCURACY AND IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SYSTEMS. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT A CTB WOULD STOP FURTHER WARHEAD DEVELOPMENT.

7. MIL'SHTEYN BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS, POINTING OUT THAT ACCORDING TO AMERICAN SOURCES THE U.S. HAS 7,000 IN WESTERN EUROPE. HE QUESTIONED HOW WE COULD USE SO MANY, COMMENTING THAT WESTERN EUROPE ITSELF WOULD BE DESTROYED IF THEY WERE USED ON A MASSIVE SCALE. SVYATOV SAID THAT SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAD SUGGESTED A CUT IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN HIS POSTURE STATEMENT IN 1974 BUT SEEMED TO REVERSE HIMSELF IN NATO. MIL'SHTEYN ASKED WHAT HAD HAPPENED SINCE THAT TIME TO OUR TAC NUKE WARHEAD TOTALS. (WE REPLIED THAT THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE NECESSARY LEVELS WAS STILL BEING MADE.) SVYATOV ASKED WHY NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS  
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IN EUROPE. WE REPLIED THAT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD PERHAPS BE POSSIBLE IN A SUITABLE FORUM, I.E., ONE WHICH ALSO TOOK INTO ACCOUNT IRBM'S AND MRBM'S IN THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION.

8. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SVYATOV URGED NEGOTIATIONS ON NAVAL ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS. MUL'SHTEYN SAID THAT LIMITS ON NAVAL ARMS ARE VERY IMPORTANT, SECOND ONLY TO SALT (EXCLUDING, HE EXPLAINED, MBFR, WHICH IS "A DIFFERENT KIND OF PROBLEM"). MIL'SHTEYN CONTINUED THAT NAVAL EXPENDITURES ARE A HEAVY BURDEN. HE EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE TWO NATIONS SHOULD BE ABLE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT TO STOP SUCH EXPENDITURES. SVYATOV SAID THAT A BASIS FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD PERHAPS BE AN OVERALL TONNAGE LIMIT, SUCH AS IN THE WASHINGTON

TREATY.

9. SEVERAL EFFORTS TO INDUCE MIL'SHTEYN TO DISCUSS CHINESE STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PRODUCED LITTLE OF INTEREST. WHEN ASKED IF HE AGREED WITH SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S DEFENSE POSTURE STATEMENT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT PACE OF CHINESE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS SEEMS TO BE SLOWING, HE SIGNIFIED GENERAL AGREEMENT. HE NOTED THAT THE THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION NEVERTHELESS REMAINS HIGH, EVEN THOUGH IT MAY HAVE DROPPED AS FAR AS THE U.S. IS CONCERNED.

10. ALL THREE SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS SHOWED LIVELY INTEREST IN THE DEFENSE POSTURE STATEMENT THAT SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING EXCEEDS THAT OF THE U.S. DURING THE DISCUSSION SEMEYKO ADMITTED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW EXCATLY WHAT SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING IS BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. HOWEVER, ALL THREE SOVIETS FELT THAT U.S. ESTIMATES OF SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING ARE INFLATED. THEY AGREED THAT EQUIPMENT COSTS ON TWO SIDES ARE PROBABLY COMPARABLE, BUT POINTED OUT LARGE DISPARITY IN SALARIES OF U.S. AND SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL.  
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